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DANTBAN1 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 Plaintiff, 5 12 CV 1422 (JSR) V. 6 BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, 7 successor to Countrywide Financial Corporation, 8 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and Full Spectrum Lending, et 9 al., Defendants. 10 11 ----x New York, N.Y. 12 October 23, 2013 12:15 p.m. 13 Before: 14 HON. JED S. RAKOFF, 15 District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

DANTBAN1

1	APPEARANCES
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23	
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(In open court, jury not present)

THE COURT: So first of all, last night we got a note as the jurors were leaving, which we marked as Jury Note Number 9, which simply says that Frank Verni, juror number seven, has been selected as the foreperson.

Now we have just received at 12:01 a jury note which we marked as Jury Note Number 10.

- Why are three people named as managerial on page
 of the instructions and only one person is charged?
 - 2. We would like to review the video of John Boland.

 Taking the last point first, how long a video is that?

MS. SCHOENBERGER: It's about 55 minutes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So I'm inclined to tell them we will show them that video right after lunch at 2 o'clock.

With respect to number one, I'm inclined to first point them to the instructions that said -- portion of the instruction that the defense presciently asked me to include about don't speculate about matters not in evidence, and then simply to say that this is not their concern. But let me hear from either side if they want to be heard on this.

MS. MAINIGI: We have no objection to that, your Honor.

MR. ARMAND: No objection from the government, your Honor.

MR. MUKASEY: Judge, could I have just 30 more seconds

to confer? I'm inclined to agree with your Honor but I want to make sure that nothing comes out that suggests that --

THE COURT: I will work out the wording right now.

In rethinking, I'm wondering if we should call them in now and play the first, say, 20 minutes or so of the video and so we can get that moving, and then they will only have to -- because I hate to wait until 2 o'clock to play the whole thing.

MR. MUKASEY: That's fine, certainly, with us.

THE COURT: So I will give them orally an instruction. Is there anything further you wanted me to say?

MR. MUKASEY: I wanted to make sure that nothing suggests to the jury that the person who is named is somehow more culpable than the other two that were not named.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MUKASEY: Or that somehow leaves them with the impression that the other two managerial agents, Lumsden or Kitashima, settled or cut a deal or somehow got their way out of this thing. I want them to be left with the impression that --

THE COURT: I think the less we say, therefore, the better, tell them that it's, in effect, none of their business. I'm happy, but I don't know why anyone would want me to do this, to say these are matters of discretion that involve all sorts of matters, none of which are before you that -- but I think that would be a big mistake. I think just point them to

the portion of the charge which begins at the bottom of page 2, "Also, you should be careful not to speculate about matters not in evidence. Rather, your focus should be entirely on assessing the evidence that was presented, and not on speculating about what other evidence, if any, might have been obtained." And then simply add that applies equally to your question about why only one person was charged. I think to add anything more to that is to invite the very speculation we're asking them not to.

MR. MUKASEY: Understood.

THE COURT: Agreed?

MR. MUKASEY: Yeah.

MS. MAINIGI: That's fine, your Honor. On the video, our preference would be for the jurors to hear the video in one sitting as opposed to breaking it up over lunch.

THE COURT: That was my original intent, but then -
I'll tell you what, why don't we bring them in and we'll ask

them whether they want to hear half now and half after lunch or

hear the whole thing after lunch. My concern is that they not

feel we're leaving them hanging for an hour and 40 minutes.

MS. MAINIGI: Could you ask if they would be willing to delay lunch for a little bit and hear the whole thing?

THE COURT: Yes, I have a meeting that I can't delay, but in theory I don't have to be here, right?

MS. MAINIGI: We would rather not break up their

1 hearing of the video.

MR. HEFTER: I have an issue with respect to the video. You will recall there are a number of limiting instructions within the video about -- in fact Mr. Cohen stood up --

THE COURT: So I may have to be here.

MR. HEFTER: You may have to be here.

THE COURT: So the choice now is half now and half later or all later.

Let's bring in the jury.

There's one other possibility, which is we could send in a transcript of the video if anyone would prefer that. That would include, if the transcript was the one here in court, the limiting instructions are right there.

MR. ARMAND: I think the government's preference would be to play the video.

THE COURT: OK.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: So good morning, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your notes. And let me express my condolences to juror number seven on being selected foreperson.

So with respect to the first part of your note, which reads, "Why are three people named as managerial on page 12 of the instructions and only one person is charged," the short answer is it's none of your business. But the longer answer is

I want to remind you that beginning at the very bottom of page 2 of instructions, the instruction reads, "Also, you should be careful not to speculate about matters not in evidence.

Rather, your focus should be entirely on assessing the evidence that was presented and not on speculating about what other evidence, if any, might have been obtained." And there's no evidence whatsoever on this issue that's addressed by your first question, and it's not your concern. You need to decide this matter based on the evidence before you and not be concerned with speculating about matters that are not in evidence.

With respect to your second request, "We would like to review the video of John Boland," we're of course happy to accommodate that. And there are two possibilities, it takes about 55 minutes, and unfortunately I need to be at a luncheon meeting shortly before one o'clock. So we could do part of it now and part of it after lunch, or we could do all of it starting at two o'clock.

So Mr. Foreperson, do you have a preference in that regard?

THE FOREPERSON: Yes, we'll see half of it now.

THE COURT: Everyone else agree?

JUROR: Yes.

THE COURT: So let's start the video.

To save our court reporter to have to record it again,

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it will be exactly as before with the same -- and I will
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      intersperse the same limiting instructions upon request of
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      defense counsel.
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               MR. HEFTER: Thank you, your Honor.
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               If we could pause for one second so we could find the
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      transcript so we could follow along in order to enable us to do
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      that.
               THE COURT: Yes. I will tell you what, counsel, take
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     my copy.
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               MR. HEFTER: That's fine, your Honor, thank you.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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               (Video recording played).
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               THE COURT: Hold it for a minute. Counsel, come to
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     the side bar.
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               (Video recording paused)
16
               (At Side bar)
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               THE COURT: Mr. Mukasey, I didn't want to embarrass
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      you folks. Your two guys are sitting here rifling through
     papers, making a lot of sound. I can hear them all the way up
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      here distracting the jury, distracting the Court.
               MR. MUKASEY: We'll take care of it.
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               THE COURT: Tell them to sit down and stop moving.
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               MR. MUKASEY: Got it.
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               (In open court)
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               THE COURT: Go ahead.
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MR. HEFTER: Yeah, your Honor, and I believe the limitation was sought subsequent to the prior answer, and I believe your Honor --

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               THE COURT: Retroactively.
               MR. HEFTER: -- retroactively applied the instruction.
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               THE COURT: All right. So I think this is probably a
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      good place to stop anyway, and we'll pick up with that
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      instruction when we resume.
               So ladies and gentlemen, we'll hear the rest of it at
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 7
      2 o'clock.
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               (Jury not present)
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               THE COURT: All right. I will see you all.
               (Luncheon recess taken)
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               (Jury not present)
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               THE COURT: So are counsel now agreed as to the
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      limiting instruction on the last question?
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               MS. SCHOENBERGER: Yes, I think we'll just back up to
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      that question and pause it.
               THE COURT: Yes, we should go back to the question.
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               MS. SCHOENBERGER: Your Honor, we have the video
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      queued up to where he's shown the document, and we'll pause
      after the question: And what's your response to her request?
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               THE COURT: Yes, all right. Very good.
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               MR. HEFTER: And your Honor, I have your copy that you
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     handed me if you would like that back.
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               THE COURT: I was hoping I might see it again.
24
      you.
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               MR. HEFTER: I will apologize for one thing, I think I
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have one or more lines where I thought the instructions were
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      on, just for my reference.
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               THE COURT: Yes, that's fine. I was hoping for an
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      autograph.
               MR. HEFTER: There's no editorial comment.
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               THE COURT: All right. Let's bring in the jury.
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               (Jury present)
               THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we're
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9
      ready to continue. You will have the pleasure of watching the
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      movie and all the lawyers will be carefully looking at you
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      hoping for some hint as to what you're thinking, but don't give
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      them any.
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               Please continue.
14
               (Video recording played)
15
               (Video recording paused)
               THE COURT: So the answer that's about to come up,
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17
      ladies and gentlemen, is received against the bank defendants
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      only.
               Go ahead.
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               (Video recording played)
21
               (Video recording paused)
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               MR. HEFTER: Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: And the next answer will be received as to
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      the bank defendants only.
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               (Video recording played)
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(Video recording paused)
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               MR. HEFTER: Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Yes, I'm sorry, once again, ladies and
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 4
      gentlemen, the same limiting instruction as to the next answer.
 5
               (Video recording played)
6
               (Video recording paused)
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               MR. HEFTER: Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Same limitation as to the next answer.
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9
               (Video recording played)
10
               (Video recording paused)
11
               MR. HEFTER: Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Same limiting instruction as to the next
13
      answer.
14
               (Video recording played)
15
               (Video recording paused)
               THE COURT: All right. So ladies and gentlemen, that
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      concludes the videotape deposition. So you should go back and
      continue your deliberations and let us know if we can be of any
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19
      further assistance to you.
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               (Jury not present)
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               THE COURT: Anything else we need to take up?
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               MS. MAINIGI: No, your Honor.
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               MR. ARMAND: No, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Very good, we'll see you whenever.
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               (Recess taken)
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(Jury not present)

THE COURT: I understand we have a verdict. Let's bring in the jury. The note says, "We have reached a verdict." That will be marked as Jury Note Number 12.

Let's bring in the jury.

Now the lawyers should be aware that -- I'll say this afterwards.

(Jury present)

(Time noted, 3:28 p.m.)

THE COURT: So ladies and gentlemen, we understand you have reached a verdict. In a minute we will take the verdict form your foreperson, and I will open it and then we will take the reading of the verdict.

I will not comment on the verdict because the determination of the verdict is your job, not mine, but I, before I see the verdict, I do want to comment on what a splendid jury you were. I had occasion, of course, to watch you out of the corner of my eye, and I was just really so impressed how carefully you all followed the witness. Many of you were taking notes; those that weren't were equally attentive. You were very prompt, unlike some judges I know, and all in all you did a really splendid job.

I have another trial starting soon, I thought maybe -you'll be glad to know the law does not permit that. In fact,
you will be excused for jury service for four years.

1 So we will get the verdict form now from your 2 foreperson. 3 DEPUTY CLERK: Mr. Foreperson, please rise. 4 You say you have agreed upon a verdict? 5 THE FOREPERSON: We've agreed upon a verdict. 6 THE COURT: All right. The verdict is in proper form. 7 I will give it to my courtroom deputy to take the reading of the verdict. 8 9 Mr. Foreperson, please rise. 10 DEPUTY CLERK: Mr. Foreperson, you say, as to United 11 States of America versus Countrywide Home Loans, Incorporated, Countrywide Bank, FSB, Bank of America and Rebecca Mairone, 12 13 docket number 12 Civil 1422. 14 Question 1. The government's claim against the Bank 15 Defendants on the government's claim of fraud, you, the jury, find the bank defendants liable or not liable. You say? 16 17 THE FOREPERSON: Liable. 18 DEPUTY CLERK: Question 2. The government's claim against Rebecca Mairone on the government's claim of fraud, 19 20 you, the jury, find Rebecca Mairone liable or not liable. You 21 say? 22 THE FOREPERSON: Liable. 23 DEPUTY CLERK: Listen to your verdict as it stands 24 recorded. As to United States of America versus Countrywide:

Question 1, the government's claim against the Bank

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Defendants on the government's claim of fraud you, the jury,
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      find the Bank Defendants liable.
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 3
               Question 2. Government's claim against Rebecca
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     Mairone on the government's claim of fraud you, the jury, find
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      Rebecca Mairone liable.
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               Juror number one, is that your verdict?
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               JUROR: Yes.
               DEPUTY CLERK: Juror number two, is that your verdict?
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               JUROR: Yes.
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               DEPUTY CLERK: Juror number three, is that your
      verdict?
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               JUROR: Yes.
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               DEPUTY CLERK: Juror number four, is that your
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      verdict?
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               JUROR: Yes.
               DEPUTY CLERK: Juror number five, is that your
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17
      verdict?
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               JUROR: Yes.
                              Juror number six, is that your verdict?
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               DEPUTY CLERK:
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               JUROR: Yes.
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               DEPUTY CLERK: Juror number seven, is that your
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      verdict?
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               JUROR: Yes.
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               DEPUTY CLERK: Juror number eight, is that your
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      verdict?
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1 JUROR: Yes.

DEPUTY CLERK: Juror number nine, is that your verdict?

JUROR: Yes.

DEPUTY CLERK: Juror number ten, is that your verdict?

JUROR: Yes.

DEPUTY CLERK: Jury polled, your Honor, verdict unanimous.

THE COURT: Very good. We'll take the original verdict form back from the foreperson.

Ladies and gentlemen, once again I want to express my very great thanks to you.

One last housekeeping item. It's natural for the lawyers sometimes to want to talk to the jurors. The law in this Court is that the only time they can talk to you without permission of the Court is as you're leaving the jury room. So if any lawyer is there and says I would like to talk to you, it's up to you whether you want to talk to them or not.

Similarly, you may be approached by members of the media. I have no control over them and they are free to approach you, but they, too, I am sure, will respect your wishes. On the one hand, it's perfectly natural for them to want to know what is going on, on the other hand, there are good reasons why the jury process is confidential. And so it's totally up to you whether you want to talk to them or not, but

I just wanted you to be aware of the possibility that they may 1 2 seek to talk to you. As I say, I'm quite confident if you say 3 no to them they will respect that as well. 4 Again, all my great thanks, and you are now excused. 5 (Jury excused) 6 THE COURT: All right. So we need to now schedule the 7 penalty phase. Does either side wish to present testimony with 8 respect to that phase or do you just want to have paper 9 submissions? 10 MS. MAINIGI: We would like to have an evidentiary 11 phase, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: All right. I would be ready to start it 13 forthwith, but --14 MS. MAINIGI: We're prepared to start. THE COURT: That's impressive. Who do you want to 15 call? 16 17 MS. MAINIGI: Our experts and Mr. Tom Scrivener. 18 THE COURT: How about Ms. Mairone, are you planning on 19 calling -- is counsel for Ms. Mairone planning on calling 20 anyone? 21 MR. MUKASEY: I think we plan to reserve our right and 22 we will let the Court know as soon as possible. THE COURT: No, we have to schedule this now. I 23 24 indicated at the very outset that we would start immediately.

MR. MUKASEY: I apologize.

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THE COURT: I stated it on the record. But fair enough, I mean it's been a long four weeks, I don't want to put anyone in an impossible position.

I will tell you what, do you think you would know the answer by tomorrow morning?

MR. MUKASEY: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Why don't you call chambers jointly at 10:30 tomorrow morning and we will -- I want a definitive list from all sides as to who they want to call and we will schedule it. It is certainly going to be within the next two weeks, worst case. I'm hoping to do better than that. That would be the outside.

MS. MAINIGI: Your Honor, it would be our request, your Honor, that we understood "immediately" to mean immediately, and so it would certainly be our request that we proceed as early as tomorrow if your Honor would allow.

THE COURT: Yeah, the problem, of course, is that since this trial has gone on for four weeks, when the jury went out I scheduled a bunch of things for tomorrow thinking they would still be deliberating, and I'm going to be in Chicago, as you know, on Friday. But Monday might be a possibility. We might be able to take one witness tomorrow.

What's the government's --

MR. ARMAND: Your Honor, I don't think we would be ready to proceed tomorrow, but Monday I believe -- it's just

that we have to coordinate with our expert, Dr. Joseph Mason, just to make sure that he's available tomorrow, and we need to meet with him first. So it would be preferable for us to start on Monday.

THE COURT: Let's see what we -- I know that Tuesday and Wednesday of next week are not good, but Monday I think is --

What do we have on Monday?
(Pause)

THE COURT: I have a bunch of things on Monday, but they could possibly be moved. Most of them were moved once already because of the trial, but they could be moved again. Why don't we do this, we will tentatively plan on Monday, but you should call tomorrow — let's make it a little later, why don't we say noon tomorrow. That will give me a chance to contact the lawyers in the other matters and make sure I can move those things around. And I want to know definitively at noon tomorrow who is calling whom. We should — you should also think about if anyone wants to make written submissions and then we'll work out a schedule for those as well.

MR. ARMAND: Question, your Honor, in terms of listening to defense counsel, the witnesses that they intend to call, is causation an aspect of the evidentiary hearing that your Honor would like to hear evidence on?

THE COURT: Certainly I left open that possibility.

That was when I ruled on the motion in limine I made clear that that wasn't part of liability but it could conceivably bear on penalty. I want to go back and look tonight. It seems — this is an unusual statute in that it talks of penalty but then it talks of certain measures for assessing the penalty. So I want to take a greater look at that before I answer your question dispositively, but for now you should assume that everything is open, but I will let you know more dispositively when we talk at noon tomorrow.

MR. ARMAND: Your Honor, I am thinking it might make sense, for the same reasons we did not think that causation was appropriate for the mail and wire fraud charge, and also don't think it's appropriate for the penalties phase.

THE COURT: Well, I think if anything it cuts the other way. I have been of the view from day one that the reason — that it required a fair degree of speculation to determine the relationship between the fraud and the loss.

Let's pull out the statute. Remind me, what's the section that bears on penalty?

MR. ARMAND: It's 12, USC, 1833, I think B -- 1833(a), Paragraph B that lists the penalties.

THE COURT: I don't have a copy of it up here. Do you have a copy?

MR. ARMAND: I usually keep FIRREA in my back pocket, but not today.

1 THE COURT: You never know when you could be pick 2 pocketed. 3 Never mind, I will look at it overnight. 4 Anything else we need to take up right now? 5 MR. ARMAND: Would your Honor consider briefing on the causation issue with regard to the penalties hearing? 6 7 THE COURT: I think -- I'm sorry I don't have the 8 statute in front of me right now. Let me see if one of my law 9 clerks could lay it out so we can -- I would rather not leave 10 you hanging until tomorrow morning. So give me the section 11 again? MR. ARMAND: 12, USC, 1833(a) Paragraph B. 12 13 THE COURT: OK. 14 MS. MAINIGI: While we're waiting, we would like to 15 docket all of our letter submissions. THE COURT: Yes. Hand them up and I will give them to 16 17 my courtroom deputy. 18 Does any other party have anything they want to docket? 19 20 MS. MAINIGI: I believe these include the government's 21 and Ms. Mairone's submissions as well. 22 MR. HEFTER: I believe that's true. 23 THE COURT: OK. Great. 24 You are all obviously much stronger lawyers than I 25 ever was. When I lost a case I wanted to get drunk and when I

won a case I wanted to get drunk, but you want to do good hard work, and all the more credit to you.

MR. MUKASEY: I want to get drunk.

THE COURT: So I will turn this volume of letters -- the government already looked at this as well?

MR. ARMAND: Yes, your Honor. They're not all letters, I think there are also the proposed instructions that your Honor requested.

THE COURT: These are items that both sides want to have docketed?

MR. ARMAND: We were not offering the draft instructions, but obviously I don't think we have -- we don't take any position one way or the other.

THE COURT: Anything that was submitted to the Court that any party wants to have docketed I will docket.

MR. ARMAND: Very well, your Honor.

THE COURT: So there they are.

All right. I mention again, just so everyone is aware of it because it's not the rule in every courthouse. Under a Second Circuit case, lawyers can only interview jurors with the express prior permission of the Court, except as they're leaving the jury room. I don't know that anyone would need or want do that, but I mention that.

So let's see. The relevant part of the statute reads as follows, this is 12, USC, Section 1833(a), Subsection B,

1 maximum amount of penalty.

- 1. Generally, the amount of the civil penalty shall not exceed \$1 million.
- 2. Special rule for continuing violations. In the case of a continuing violation, the amount of the civil penalty may exceed the amount described in paragraph one but may not exceed the lesser of \$1 million per day or \$5 million.
- 3. Special rule for violations creating gain or loss. If any person derives pecuniary gain from the violation, or if the violation results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the violator, the amount of the civil penalty may exceed the amounts described in paragraphs one and two but may not exceed the amount of such gain or loss.

As used in this paragraph, the term "persons" includes the Bank Insurance Fund the Savings Association Insurance Fund, and after the merger of such funds, the Deposit Insurance Fund and the National Credit Union Shared Insurance Fund.

So let me ask the government, it says it can exceed one and two but only if the violation results in a pecuniary loss to a person other than the violator, but "person" is then defined to include -- I don't know whether that means exclusively or more likely in addition -- the bank insurance, et cetera. So what's your view of that provision?

MR. ARMAND: We read "person" to be from 1 USC 1 to apply broadly to anyone that is not the violator, and so that

would include the GSEs. 1 2 THE COURT: And I take it you are seeking, at least as 3 to the bank, a penalty in excess of \$5 million? 4 MR. ARMAND: Yes, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: All right. Are you seeking a penalty in excess of \$5 million as to Ms. Mairone? 6 7 MR. ARMAND: I think the government is generally seeking the maximum penalty. However, I think we would like to 8 9 confer to -- frankly, we haven't discussed in terms of the 10 specific amount we would be seeking with regard to Ms. Mairone. 11 THE COURT: I think that would be worthy of your further consideration. 12 13 MR. ARMAND: Absolutely. And there's information yet 14 that we don't yet have from Ms. Mairone that we would like to 15 consider before making that application. THE COURT: Now so at least with respect to the bank 16 17 defendants, if any person derives pecuniary gain from the 18 violation, I think we already know the amount of gain was --19 what was it, one million something or other?

MR. ARMAND: For all Hustle loans, approximately \$165 million.

THE COURT: Sorry. And are you saying that the loss is greater than that?

MR. ARMAND: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why is that?

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MR. ARMAND: The losses to the GSEs from the purchase of Hustle loans depending on if you're looking at the gross loss figure or the net loss figure. If you are looking at all the Hustle loans, regardless of whether they were defective, I believe the number is about \$840 million, according to our expert, Dr. Mason.

If you are looking at the gross losses from solely defective Hustle loans, it's in the neighborhood of \$500 million.

And if you're looking at net losses, net losses for defective Hustle loans -- and I'm talking about gross versus net, gross is the amount as of the time of the default, which is the unpaid balance which was essentially stuck with the GSEs at that time, the loss at that time, but through the foreclosure or liquidation process there were perhaps some insurance, they were able to get some of the money back after the property is foreclosed, and the net loss for the defective Hustle loans after all of these funds had been recouped is approximately 130 million for the defective Hustle loans.

THE COURT: So if we were taking -- if we were taking the net loss, that is a figure less than the gain.

MR. ARMAND: Yes, if you're talking about net loss, yes.

THE COURT: So it sounds to me like we ought to decide first whether the appropriate measure is net loss or gross

loss, because if it's net loss we don't have to have an evidentiary hearing at all, do we? Unless there's a dispute over the amount of the gain.

MR. ARMAND: In terms of just -- would your Honor want either still a presentation in terms of what the experts -- they have their own expert report about what they believe the correct numbers are.

THE COURT: I understand that, but I'm trying to figure out how we proceed. Assuming for the sake of argument -- I have no opinion on this, as just the layout of the land, assuming for sake of argument the net loss is a more appropriate measure than gross loss, then the government would be seeking, would it not, gain, because that would be the higher figure?

MR. ARMAND: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And is there any dispute about the amount of gain?

MR. SMURZYNSKI: Your Honor, if that's addressed to the bank defendants, the answer is yes, there's a dispute to the amount of the gain.

THE COURT: What's the basis of that dispute?

MR. SMURZYNSKI: There are multiple bases. I would be happy to outline them.

THE COURT: I'm delighted.

MR. SMURZYNSKI: The first issue is: What is the

population of HSSL loans? There's nothing in the verdict of the jury that determines that amount, so that is still an open question, whether it's 28,882 loans or something else. That's number one.

Number two, the government's theory was not that the process was the fraud and the failure to disclose the process, but the government's theory as explained in the charging conference and the jury instructions was that the misrepresentations were on a loan-by-loan basis, and the government's theory is that 57 percent of the loans were not defective, and so we'll have to figure out what portion is that.

Finally, the number that was presented in the liability phase was an income number, not a gain number, not a profit number, and what the actual profit is for purposes of the statute is still an open question.

THE COURT: Well, except possibly as to the last of the items you mentioned, all the relevant evidence is already before me, right?

MR. SMURZYNSKI: I agree, but there's still a factual determination to be made. But I agree with regard to the population and with regard to what is the defect -- what is the defective portion of the population.

THE COURT: So I agree we have to decide whether your version of that or their version of that is the right measure

and so forth, but all the evidence that bears on that is fully before me, and so it would be in effect an arithmetic calculation once I made those determinations.

MR. SMURZYNSKI: Right, and we would appreciate the opportunity to make argument to your Honor on that. But in terms of creating a further record, there's no need on those two issues.

On the third issue, whether there was a gain or whether there was a profit is not an element of the offense, and therefore the defendants chose not to raise that issue in the liability phase, but now that we're in the penalty phase and it's become relevant potentially --

THE COURT: What is your basis for saying that pecuniary gain is just profit as opposed to proceeds?

MR. SMURZYNSKI: Your Honor, I appreciate the opportunity to brief that issue, but looking at the cases, our belief is that the proper way to interpret the statute is that that is a profit number.

THE COURT: But that's a question of law, yes?

MR. SMURZYNSKI: I agree it's a question of law.

THE COURT: So again, it doesn't require an evidentiary hearing, it requires briefing.

MR. SMURZYNSKI: Correct. But if you agree with our position, then there remains the question: What is the profit?

THE COURT: Yes, that might require a -- but a much

more constricted evidentiary hearing than what we have been talking about so far.

Thank you very much, that's very helpful.

Let me go back to the question of gross versus net, because we only -- gross versus net loss, because we only reach that question if gross loss is the proper measure, otherwise we're concerned with gain. And the question then is: Is loss to be measured as an approximate loss or is it to be measured on the theory that if one commits fraud one is responsible for the consequences even if other factors may have contributed to the result? You take your pick, unless you find it's not quite that concept but something akin to that. That seems to be the big question of law as well, right?

MR. ARMAND: Yes, your Honor. There's one other issue, whether or not we're talking about all Hustle loans or just ones that ended up being defective, because the reps and warrants of investment quality are to all of them.

THE COURT: These are all --

MR. ARMAND: It's a legal issue.

THE COURT: -- difficult and interesting, and I am thrilled that I get to see more of all the good lawyers here in my courtroom, but I'm not hearing any basis yet for an evidentiary hearing.

MR. SMURZYNSKI: Your Honor, when I spoke before I was addressing simply the gain issue. Under the statute,

everything you described sets forth a cap, and then your Honor will have discretion to the penalty that you impose. And there are various facts that we think would come out in an evidentiary hearing with respect to the application of that discretion.

THE COURT: Like what?

MR. SMURZYNSKI: For example, off the top of my head I apologize for not having more here, there are certain facts that came out in the liability phase but, for example, beyond that, factors such as whether the victim has resolved its claims with the defendant, the ongoing relationship between the victim and the defendant, issues like successor liability.

Some of those may be established on the record facts, but there may be others that require the taking of evidence.

THE COURT: Well, I mean what I'm hearing is that the only issue that it seemed to me there was -- well, let me rephrase this. It seems to me that I don't see how I could hold an evidentiary hearing that would be useful until I resolve all these legal issues that have now surfaced. Because while there will probably be, from what you're saying, some legal issues left, depending on my rulings there may be many or may be few, and why go through the whole business sort of the blindly without having resolved those legal issues first?

MR. SMURZYNSKI: We agree with you, your Honor.

THE COURT: So why don't we set a schedule then for

briefing of the legal issues and then we don't have to worry 1 about calling your experts yet or calling me. 2 3 So the government has the burden, of course. So when 4 would you like to get in your papers which would address all 5 the legal issues -- maybe get a copy of the transcript -- that 6 have just surfaced, and you can ask your adversary to flag for 7 you any additional legal issues that they're planning to raise so that you -- they're all addressed in your moving papers. 8 9 How long would you like for that? 10 MR. ARMAND: Would the end of next week be 11 appropriate? 12 THE COURT: Yes. So that would be November 1st. 13 And how long would defense counsel like? 14 MR. SMURZYNSKI: Your Honor, could we have ten days to 15 respond to that? THE COURT: Yes, that's fine. So that is 16 17 November 11th. Actually November 11th I think the courthouse is closed. Yes. So November 12th. 18 19 And how long does the government want for reply? 20 MR. ARMAND: A week, your Honor, please? 21 THE COURT: Yes, so that would be November 19th. 22 MR. ARMAND: Your Honor, would it be possible to get a 23 deadline for the defense to flag any issues? 24 THE COURT: Yes. How long does defense want for that

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purpose?

MR. SMURZYNSKI: Your Honor, could we have until 1 2 Monday to do that? 3 THE COURT: Yes, close of business Monday. And then 4 why don't we have oral argument on Monday, November 25th. 5 That's Thanksgiving week, so I want to have it early in the week. Let's see what is available. 6 7 3:30 on the 25th. MR. SINGER: Your Honor, this is a personal plea, I 8 9 have a long planned family vacation that week. Would it be 10 possible to do it after Thanksqiving? 11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 MR. SINGER: I am supposed to return the Monday 13 following Thanksqiving. 14 THE COURT: December 2nd. I hate to do it on Tuesdays and Wednesdays because of Columbia. How about December 5th, 15 16 4:00 p.m. I can imagine that argument going some length, so 17 we'll put aside until 7 o'clock that evening for that argument. 18 And I will undertake to rule on any and all issues so presented by December 31st, so if there is a need for an 19 20 evidentiary hearing it will be in early January, so you can at 21 least alert your experts as to that possibility. 22 All right. Anything else we need to take up today? 23 All right. Thanks very much. 24 (Trial concluded)

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